How do I identify and verify beneficial owners under the AML Regulation? The most important changes
The AML Regulation fundamentally changes the requirements for identifying and verifying beneficial owners and senior managing officials. This article shows what data will need to be collected in the future, which verification methods apply, and where the biggest challenges lie.
Identifying beneficial owners: More data, stricter rules
The identification and verification of beneficial owners requires a clearly determined and documented ownership and control structure - structure determination and UBO determination form a closely intertwined process.
Previously, it was sufficient to collect first and last names (as well as other risk-based identifying characteristics). If collected directly from the customer, verification was completed with a subsequent comparison to the transparency register – provided the data matched. Alternatively, obliged entities could independently determine the beneficial owners using shareholder lists or articles of association and compare the resulting data with the transparency register – this method was mandatory even if a discrepancy was found between the data collected directly from the customer and the data in the transparency register. With the entry into force of the AML Regulation, the scope of the data to be collected and the obligations for verifying the beneficial owner data will change.
Extended dataset will become mandatory
Previously, for beneficial owners, first and last names were usually sufficient; collecting date of birth, place of birth, and residential address was at the discretion of the obliged entity. The AML Regulation significantly expands the required information:
- Date of birth, place of birth, residential address (including country)
- All nationalities
- ID document number
- Personal Identification Number (if applicable)
- General description of the sources of this number
This information goes beyond what is normally available in public registers. Obligated parties should therefore actively involve customers in the data collection process.
Verification: Requirements in theory
In theory, beneficial owner data can be verified by presenting a valid identity document (face-to-face), using electronic identification devices with a security level of "substantial" or "high" according to the eIDAS Regulation, or by using qualified trust services. In practice, however, implementing these methods is likely to prove difficult, as "reasonable measures" represent a significantly more practical alternative.
“Reasonable measures” as a viable alternative
Obligated entities may take "appropriate measures" and obtain information from reliable sources. The crucial difference to the German Money Laundering Act (GwG): According to the GwG, a comparison of the customer's business transaction data with the transparency register is sufficient for verification, provided no discrepancies are found. In the event of discrepancies, the obligated entity must take further risk-based measures to complete the verification. The regulations do not specify these risk-based measures in detail; in practice, register documents (shareholder list, articles of association) or copies of identification documents are usually used. In the future, the verification requirements will be significantly tightened: At least one source from a predefined list must be used.
These sources include:
- Public registers (except transparency registers): e.g., residents' registration office, tax register, passport database, land register (where accessible)
- Information from the customer or third parties, such as reputable credit reference agencies, electricity/gas bills in the name of the wE, confirmations from other financial institutions, or certified documents from the customer/legal entity in which the wE is named and which are certified by authorized persons
Increased obligations for low-risk investments?
The AML Regulation follows a risk-based approach and defines different requirements depending on the ML/TF risk. However, the approach for low-risk cases is not consistent overall
Low-risk scenarios: The following sources are permitted in cases of low ML/TF risk:
- Transparency register or commercial register
- Customer details, including existing data
- Other publicly available information from reliable, independent sources
Important: Identification and verification must not be carried out using the same source. Sources a) – c) are considered acceptable sources for identification, and b) – c) are considered acceptable sources for verification. Unfortunately, this means that the low-risk requirements are stricter than the general due diligence obligations, where the commercial register is indeed considered an acceptable source for verification. Obligated parties could argue that the commercial register counts as a reliable, independent source and therefore falls under point c). It is hoped that these discrepancies will be resolved in the final version of the RTS.
Practical challenges and solutions
The expansion of the KYC data to be collected and the verification requirements leads to a significant increase in workload: Obligated entities must consult the central register (in Germany: the Transparency Register) in the company's country of domicile. Contrary to the previous legal situation under the Money Laundering Act (GwG), the AML Regulation also requires consultation of the central register of another EU member state, provided the customer has its registered office there. This means either connecting to the registers in the respective countries or obtaining a central register extract from the customer. Regardless of the approach chosen, practical hurdles exist, such as language restrictions and national cost regulations. While there are plans for a centralized, EU-wide register platform with an English user interface, current forecasts indicate that it will not be available until mid-2027.
- Many of the new mandatory details regarding beneficial owners (e.g., ID number) are not included in register documents and can only be obtained through direct customer interaction. Verifying this data is also far from trivial (see the list of sources above). However, the AML Regulation leaves open the question of whether all KYC data relating to the beneficial owner actually needs to be verified. Obligated entities could argue that the term 'identity' refers only to the attributes name, date of birth, and place of residence, and that only these may not be verified using the information in the transparency register. For the other accompanying KYC attributes, however, the transparency register could indeed be used as a verification source.
- To fulfill the obligation to use at least one source from the prescribed list, many obliged entities will resort to credit reporting agencies, as this is likely the most practical solution. For example, a scanned copy of an ID card is no longer sufficient (as is currently the case under the Money Laundering Act); instead, the document must be certified by an authorized person (e.g., a lawyer or notary). Therefore, using credit reporting agencies will likely prove to be the most customer-friendly solution. Nevertheless, obliged entities will need to fundamentally adapt their existing verification processes.
Best Practice: The hybrid approach
This process proposal combines data quality with customer centricity and remains compliant:
- Pre-filling: The customer receives a digital, pre-filled questionnaire for collecting their e-data. This pre-filling is done via an interface to KYC utilities or secondary data providers.
- Addendum: The customer completes missing wE attributes.
- Risk-differentiated verification: Low-risk via publicly available information (alternative: collection via transparency register, verification via customer confirmation), medium-risk via credit reference agency.
In principle, obliged entities should choose a scenario- and risk-based approach, rather than a one-size-fits-all process.
Senior Managing Officials: New safety net with tipping-off protection
Starting point: If no UBOs can be identified
The AML Regulation tightens the handling of cases where no beneficial owner can be identified or where there are reasonable doubts about the identification. The new system does not establish management as the beneficial owner, but rather as a regulatory fallback solution for full transparency at the individual level – with a clearly defined group of people: Senior Managing Officials are defined as the executive members of the management body, not just any senior employee without executive responsibilities.
The principle remains: investigations by the police always take precedence; only after all reasonable measures have been exhausted may senior managing officials be contacted. A single unsuccessful inquiry is not sufficient.
What exactly needs to be done?
If no natural person can be identified as the beneficial owner, or if there are reasonable doubts, obliged entities must, as a regulatory fallback solution:
- Document that no beneficial owner could be identified
- Identify all natural persons belonging to the management level and collect the same data set as for the wE
- to verify their identity, analogous to the procedure used for wE
Tipping-off protection as an exception
A key innovation: If the verification of the management level could lead the customer to conclude that there are doubts about the UBO structure or that a fallback solution has been used, obliged entities waive the identity verification of the management level.
Instead, they must document:
- The investigative measures carried out to determine UBO
- The difficulties encountered
The aim is to protect sensitive suspicions and prevent tipping off without compromising the transparency required for oversight and auditing. Importantly, applying this exception does not automatically trigger an obligation to terminate the business relationship – the obliged entity has fulfilled its due diligence obligations but retains the discretion to either not enter into or terminate the relationship based on its own risk appetite.
Specification by the RTS
The RTS specify the requirements: Obligated entities must collect the same information from senior managing officials as from beneficial owners, whereby the business address may be used as an alternative to the private residential address. Identity must be verified in the same way as for beneficial owners.
In practice, this means: no scaled-down identification standard, but full equality at the procedural level.
Nevertheless, entities subject to KYC requirements should not simply enter senior managing officials into the existing data fields for beneficial owners in their systems. Dedicated fields for this role create the prerequisite for using existing discretionary leeway – for example, in PEP screening – in a targeted and risk-based manner.
Distinction from the Money Laundering Act (GwG)
According to the current Money Laundering Act (GwG), if the beneficial owners cannot be identified, it is sufficient to identify a fictitious beneficial owner (legal representatives, managing partners, partners).
A key difference from the AML Regulation: Under the German Money Laundering Act (GwG), a single fictitious beneficial owner is sufficient in the risk-based approach, even if several are potentially present. The AML Regulation, on the other hand, requires the identification of all senior managing officials.
Challenges and solutions
The double tightening of regulations – no longer just one fictitious beneficial owner, but all senior managing officials, combined with an expanded data set and increased verification requirements – can cause considerable effort, especially for international corporations.
A significant degree of discretion exists regarding PEP screening: The AML Regulation mandates this for customers and beneficial owners, but not explicitly for senior managing officials. Obligated entities can therefore design the screening of this role on a risk-based approach and, for example, limit it to cases where there are concrete indications of PEP status.
Outlook: Expanded datasets require new processes
The AML Regulation fundamentally changes identification and verification: expanded data sets, stricter verification requirements, and new regulations for senior managing officials as a fallback solution necessitate adjustments to processes, systems, and resource planning. Clear internal decision points and sound documentation logic are needed, for example, to explicitly define the exception to prevent tipping off.
One of the biggest challenges: Obligated entities will have to collect significantly more data in the future that is not available in public registers. At the same time, the requirements for the verification process are increasing. This necessitates more active customer involvement and fundamental process adjustments – both for beneficial owners and senior managing officials.
Those who start with pilot projects early can test processes before the entire portfolio is affected.
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FAQ
What data must be collected on beneficial owners under the AML Regulation?
In addition to the name, future information required includes date of birth, place of birth, residential address including country, all nationalities, the number of an identity document, a personal identification number (if applicable), and a general description of the sources of this number. Under the Money Laundering Act (GwG), first and last name were usually sufficient. Much of this information is not listed in any public register and must be collected directly from the customer.
Is the transparency register under the AML Regulation sufficient for verifying beneficial owners?
No. Under the German Money Laundering Act (GwG), comparing customer information with the transparency register is sufficient, provided there are no discrepancies. Under the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AML Regulation), at least one source from a predefined list must be used, such as public registers other than the transparency register, credit reference agencies, or documents certified by authorized persons. Because a simple copy of an ID card is no longer sufficient, many obliged entities are likely to rely on credit reference agencies.
Who qualifies as a Senior Managing Official under the AML Regulation?
Senior Managing Officials are the executive members of the management body, not other senior employees. They are consulted when, after exhausting all reasonable measures, no beneficial owner can be identified or there are reasonable doubts. Unlike the single fictitious beneficial owner under the Money Laundering Act (GwG), all beneficial owners must be identified, using the same data set and verification as the actual beneficial owners; the business address may be used instead of the private address.
What happens if the verification process at the management level could warn the customer?
Under the AML Regulation, obliged entities waive the identity verification of senior managing officials to avoid tipping off. Instead, they document the investigative measures taken to identify the beneficial owner and any difficulties encountered. This exemption does not automatically obligate the institution to terminate the business relationship; the institution decides based on its risk appetite.
Do senior managing officials have to undergo PEP screening?
The AML Regulation mandates PEP screening for customers and beneficial owners, but not explicitly for senior managing officials. Obligated entities can therefore design the screening for this role on a risk-based basis, for example, only when there are concrete indications of PEP status. This requires dedicated data fields for this role within the KYC systems.
Note July 2026: This article does not replace legal or regulatory advice. It is based on the current state of the AML Regulation and the final drafts of the EBA Standards.